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The New IMF Approach to Capital Account Management  
and its Blind Spots
Lessons from Brazil and South Korea
Barbara Fritz and Daniela Prates
Abstract
As emerging economies experience a boom in capital inflows, governments 
are increasingly concerned about the downsides of these inflows. Even the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), long a stalwart proponent of financial liberalization, 
is engaging in a new debate on capital flow management. Drawing lessons from 
empirical case studies on Brazil and South Korea, this paper finds that the new IMF 
approach remains insufficient in three key respects. First, the organization’s proposed 
distinction between measures, especially between permanent prudential regulation 
and temporary policies to shield the exchange rate, is unsustainable, especially in 
countries with highly sophisticated and internationally integrated financial markets. 
Second, country-specific factors matter. In the case of Brazil, the most important 
measures are those that directly address the specific institutions within its derivative 
market. Third, in order to provide sufficient policy space for emerging markets, the 
management of international capital flows, including the measures taken by advanced 
economies, should be permanent and bilateral.
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1. Introduction 
Emerging economies1 are coping with the problems of success. Not only do they 
boast growth rates that are the envy of OECD countries, but they have also recovered 
rapidly from the financial crisis sparked by the Lehman Brothers default in 2008. As a 
consequence, emerging economies are experiencing a boom in capital inflows. Many 
governments are becoming increasingly concerned about the downsides of such 
inflows. They perceive dependence on highly volatile capital flows as a threat not only 
to short-term financial stability but also, more generally, to their domestic policy space. 
The debate about capital controls, long discarded as anachronistic, has returned to the 
political and scholarly agenda with a vengeance. 
Even the IMF (International Monetary Fund), long hostile to any kind of capital control 
regime, is engaging in a new debate on capital flow management, seeking to establish 
a set of rules for all countries. However, this debate finds the international financial 
institutions ill prepared, as well as much of academia. As Dani Rodrik (2010: 2) states: 
We currently do not know much about designing capital control regimes. The 
taboo that has [been] attached to capital controls has discouraged practical, 
policy-oriented work that would help to manage capital flows directly.
The paper seeks to contribute to this discussion by critically reviewing the current 
theoretical debate and by providing insights from the empirical study of two key 
emerging economies, Brazil and South Korea. Even if the debate on the management 
of international capital flows is far from consolidated, both in theoretical terms and 
with regard to economic policy recommendations, the global crisis has brought about 
significant rethinking, especially in terms of financial re-regulation and supervision at 
the domestic level. There is growing consensus regarding the need for a more systemic 
approach to macroeconomic, monetary and financial policies (Blanchard et al. 2010; 
Eichengreen et al. 2011), instead of one that prioritizes price-level stabilization alone. 
In comparison, regulation with regard to international capital flows has received much 
less attention, even though these are crucial for emerging economies (Ocampo 2012). 
The maintenance of a stable exchange rate to preserve the competitiveness of the 
economy and the prevention of financial instabilities and financial crises represent 
particular policy challenges for countries confronted with huge capital inflows. 
1 Emerging economies are defined here as those developing countries that have engaged in the 
process of financial globalization. This concept of emerging economies thus refers to a dynamic 
process as a growing number of countries have taken part in it since the 1990s.
 Fritz and Prates - The New IMF Approach to Capital Account Management and its Blind Spots | 2
Currency overvaluation and financial crises both have significant distributional impacts 
at various levels. Even though a drop in the exchange rate level (which means currency 
appreciation in the case of emerging economies whose exchange rate is the price of the 
foreign currency) may not lead to financial crises in the short or even in the middle run, 
the loss of international competitiveness leads to a reduction in labor-intensive exports, 
and privileges commodity exports, thus reducing employment domestically. Further to 
this, a credit boom following high capital inflows, and an increased current account 
deficit, raises the risk of severe financial crises due to sudden stops and reversals in 
capital flows. The subsequent drop in growth rates can nullify the income convergence 
effect between emerging and advanced economies in the current situation of double 
speed recovery.
Furthermore, econometric analyses find a positive and significant association between 
the Gini coefficient and macroeconomic volatility, especially in less developed countries 
(Wolf 2005; Calderón and Levy Yeyati 2009; Atkinson and Morelli 2011). Even though 
we know that economic growth per se does not translate automatically into a more equal 
distribution of income and wealth, and even if crises are not all the same, the literature 
does identify some common transmission mechanisms. Firstly, evidence shows that the 
poorest tend to lose their jobs more quickly and have fewer instruments to cushion and 
protect against the risk of economic contraction (Agénor 2004; Halac and Schmukler 
2004; Lustig 2000; CEPAL 2010). Secondly, policy reactions to crisis, especially fiscal 
policies, are highly relevant in terms of their distributional effects. Even if spending 
cuts such as those made to social transfers can be distributed in a different manner, 
affecting poorer people to a greater or lesser extent, they tend to decrease the policy 
space for redistributional policies on the part of the State (Fanelli and Jímenez 2009; 
see also Valdés 2012). Last but not least, other dimensions of economic inequality, 
which are partially interdependent with the first two aspects, may also impact social 
well-being. This is particularly true in cases of unequal opportunity, where the most 
lasting impact of the crisis may be on those cohorts who are at vulnerable stages in 
their lifecycles. The same is true for horizontal inequality, especially with respect to 
gender-specific distributional effects of crises. 
In section two we present, as our starting point, the orthodox mainstream arguments 
in favor of capital account liberalization. We then analyze the shift that has occurred 
at the IMF, as demonstrated by the organization’s new framework for capital account 
management, and point to the limits of this framework, contrasting it with other 
approaches that we view as more appropriate. In section three we go on to analyze 
the regulation of international capital flows in Brazil and Korea. The paper closes with 
some final remarks on the lessons that can be drawn from these two case studies.
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2. Reviewing the Debate
2.1. The Orthodoxy of Capital Account Liberalization: A Critical Review of the 
 Arguments
Within pure neoclassical welfare theory, the potential benefits of international capital 
mobility are clear. Traditionally, capital account liberalization has been justified using 
the following main arguments:
First, intertemporal trade, that is, trade in financial assets, allows for intertemporal 
consumption smoothing. Temporary imports of savings permit an increase in investment 
and consumption over existing domestic savings funds, to be reversed later via an 
increased volume of produced goods and/or increased productivity (e.g. Dooley 1996). 
Second, given differing capital endowment – poor countries are assumed to be relatively 
rich in labor relative to domestically available capital, and rich countries are assumed 
to be the opposite – capital flows from rich to poor countries should allow for the easing 
of capital constraints in developing economies. The increased supply of capital leads 
to higher investment and growth rates and reduces the price for capital, that is, it leads 
to interest rate parity, in the long run. It also allows for the international diffusion of new 
technology (i.e. World Bank 2001). Third, the international allocation of capital is seen 
as permitting better risk diversification2 and the possibility of financing riskier projects. 
At the same time, it is expected to increase real and financial diversification at the 
receiving side. 
Yet the empirical evidence did not deliver such a clear picture. In particular, the series 
of financial crises in emerging economies during the 1990s, most of which had made 
significant advances in liberalizing their capital accounts and were confronted with large 
booms and busts in international capital flows, called into question the potential effects 
of international financial liberalization listed above. The empirical research on these 
and earlier experiences did not support the clear-cut answers laid out in the theory. 
“Despite a huge research literature, there is nothing near to a professional consensus 
on whether the net impact of full capital account liberalization on growth poverty, or 
volatility should be regarded as favorable or not” (World Bank 2001: 20). Indeed, the 
empirical evidence on the high volatility of international capital flows convinced several 
outstanding economists (Bhagwati 1998; Rodrik 2008; Williamson et al. 2003; and 
Williamson 2005) of the problems related to international capital mobility. 
2 Tobin expressed it quite vividly when he won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1981 for his portfolio 
theory: “Well, you know, diversification - don‘t put all your eggs in one basket” (Fettig 1996).
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At the same time, however, a relevant strand of the literature continued to consider 
capital account liberalization the best solution. Key IMF publications (Rogoff et al. 
2004; Kose et al. 2006; IMF 2008) acknowledged the potential risks and costs in terms 
of financial instability and overall macroeconomic volatility but still gave capital account 
liberalization a prominent role for its “collateral effects”: with open capital accounts, 
international financial markets could impose discipline on economic policies, unleashing 
forces that would result in better government and corporate governance and thereby 
lead to financial development. Thus, the presumption that financial markets always act 
rationally, on the basis of complete information and the ability to evaluate the complex 
interaction of microeconomic and macroeconomic risks, was held up. At the same 
time, this approach presumed that there existed a best set of policy measures defined 
by market actors that would fit all countries, notwithstanding their differences in terms 
of history and institutions. 
Even within the camp of capital account liberalization advocates, however, there was 
a broad consensus that financial globalization should necessarily be combined with 
prudential financial regulation and risk management, and be carefully sequenced (e.g. 
Mussa et al. 1998; World Bank 2001). 
International financial integration has not increased macroeconomic volatility 
or crisis frequency in countries with well-developed domestic financial systems 
and a relatively high degree of institutional quality; it has, however, increased 
volatility for countries that have failed to meet these preconditions or thresholds. 
[… ] The IMF’s ‘integrated’ approach […] envisages a gradual and orderly 
sequencing of external financial liberalization and emphasizes the desirability 
of complementary reforms in the macroeconomic policy framework and the 
domestic financial system as essential components of a successful liberalization 
strategy. (IMF 2008: 3)
However, there were no clear criteria regarding the thresholds of financial liberalization, 
a criticism the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office also raised (IMF 2005). Financial 
stability was assumed to be one of the key preconditions for liberalization, as the 
empirical results suggested, while financial globalization was assumed to be the best 
way to achieve this goal. In its “integrated” or “sequencing” approach, the IMF at the 
same time gave financial sector reform top priority when recommending the liberalization 
of the capital account (IMF 2008: 14). However, it remained rather unclear regarding 
the interdependencies between existing low financial stability, high reform efforts in this 
field, and simultaneous liberalization of the capital account (Priewe 2011). 
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2.2. From Radical Financial Liberalization to the Management of Capital 
	 Inflows:	Capital	Controls	as	a	“Means	of	Last	Resort”
Since 2008, the global economy has been marked by financial turmoil and sharp 
recessions in most advanced economies, while most emerging economies and 
some developing countries have been faring much better in financial and economic 
terms (Ocampo 2012; Canuto and Giugale 2010 and Canuto and Leipziger 2012). 
This “double speed recovery,” expressed by higher growth rates in emerging and 
developing economies than in developed economies, will spur the convergence of 
per capita incomes between advanced and emerging market economies (EMEs), thus 
decreasing global economic inequality between poorer and richer countries. 
Within this context, there has been a new boom in capital flows to emerging economies 
since the global financial crisis of 2008, specifically since the first half of 2009. This 
new boom – the fourth in the post-Bretton Woods era – has been driven by the post-
crisis circumstances. After a brief interruption in the fourth quarter of 2008 and early 
2009, capital flows returned to emerging economies, chasing yields in the context of 
abundant liquidity and lower interest rates in advanced economies as a consequence 
of the countercyclical monetary policies launched in response to the crisis. Even though 
these flows have lost some momentum more recently, especially since the third quarter 
of 2011, due to the worsening of the euro crisis and another double-dip threat, we 
assume that the emerging markets will experience an extended period of high capital 
inflows (Akyüz 2011; BIS 2010; Canuto and Leipziger 2012).
As before the crisis, the currencies and assets of several emerging countries have 
become, again, the target of carry trade activities – due to interest rate differentials 
– and other kinds of capital flows. The resulting combination of high growth rates, 
accelerating inflation (also associated with a renewed commodity prices boom), 
excessive currency appreciation and/or asset price overshooting have confronted the 
emerging economies with policy dilemmas (Akyüz 2011; BIS 2010). In this scenario, the 
adoption of a restrictive monetary policy would help to contain growth and inflationary 
pressures, but it would encourage further capital inflows, which, in turn, would foster 
the asset price boom and exchange rate misalignment, aggravating the risk of future 
sudden stops and subsequent financial crises.
Concerned with the amount and volatility of these flows and their potentially damaging 
consequences for emerging economies, the IMF has been making a clear shift in its 
official position regarding the evaluation of capital controls (IMF 2010; IMF 2011a; 
Ostry et al. 2010; Ostry et al. 2011a). It views these recent capital flows mostly as a 
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consequence of international interest rate differentials and indicates that these flows 
may be temporary in nature, with potential future sudden stops and reversals in the 
event of a change in advanced economies’ interest rate levels. “Concerns that foreign 
investors may be subject to herd behavior and suffer from excessive optimism, have 
grown stronger, and even when flows are fundamentally sound, it is recognized that 
they may contribute to collateral damage” (Ostry et al. 2010: 4). 
While the IMF generally views capital inflows as beneficial, the main concern behind 
the recent change in its position is that they may have a series of negative effects 
that could exceed the distortionary costs to the domestic economy, which have 
usually been highlighted as one of the main costs of capital controls.3 The negative 
effects associated with large capital inflows are as follows: first, an appreciation of 
the domestic currency beyond the equilibrium level; second, the fiscal costs of an 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves beyond the appropriate level; third, the 
creation of inflationary pressures in the event of incomplete sterilization; and fourth, 
increased financial fragility due to the creation of bubbles in subsectors such as real 
estate or equity markets, which is magnified by maturity and currency mismatches 
related to short-term foreign inflows. 
In an initial paper, a staff position note of February 2010 (Ostry et al. 2010) that has 
since received significant attention from academics and policy makers,4 the IMF 
authors clearly defined the application of capital inflow controls as a measure of last 
resort, when all other macroeconomic policies are exhausted: 
We argue that if the economy is operating near potential, if reserves are 
adequate, if the exchange rate is not undervalued, and if the flows are likely to 
be transitory, then controls on capital inflows – together with macroeconomic 
policy adjustment and prudential measures – may usefully form part of the 
policy toolkit. (Ostry et al. 2011b: 562) 
However, there is great concern within the IMF in relation to two points: First, the 
management of capital inflows should not be used as a substitute for what are seen 
as necessary adjustment processes and reforms. This concern applies especially to 
the standard orthodox policy recipes, such as balanced fiscal policies and a monetary 
policy oriented towards price stabilization. If, for example, a pro-cyclical fiscal deficit 
3 The arguments in favor of capital import controls distinguish these measures from capital outflow 
controls, which are seen as useful only during crisis periods and only as a supplement to more 
fundamental policy adjustment (IMF 2012). 
4 Rodrik (2010), commenting on the shift in the IMF’s evaluation of capital controls, enthusiastically 
called this “an end of an era in finance.” 
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causes the domestic central bank to raise interest rates in order to counterbalance the 
potential inflationary effects of increased public demand, public spending should be 
curbed and/or taxes raised. It is argued that this measure, applied instead of capital 
controls, could allow an easing of the monetary policy, which would then lead to a 
decrease in capital inflows due to the reduction of the interest rate differential (see also 
IMF 2011a: 7).
Second, the IMF formulates a significant caveat for the potential multilateral effects of 
capital controls used by individual countries. As these could undercut the adjustment 
of undervalued currencies (however such an undervaluation may be defined and 
measured) in emerging economies, they are seen as a possible threat that might 
further increase global imbalances. Additionally, controls imposed by some countries 
could have negative externalities in the form of spillover effects on neighboring 
countries. Even if there is no clear empirical evidence,5 successful capital controls, 
so the argument goes, could deviate international flows to other emerging economies 
that are not willing or not able to establish such controls, and may be even less able to 
absorb these flows. 
Since its initial publication on the topic, the IMF has produced a series of papers in 
order to refine this new framework for capital controls, and to strengthen it based on 
country studies (IMF 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Ostry 2011a). While these papers 
adhere to the strict formulation of macroeconomic preconditions that must be fulfilled, 
as cited above, they aim to more clearly define terms and concepts for an adequate 
management of capital flows, and introduce some modifications with respect to the first 
papers.
Ostry (2011a: 11) first states that there is no unique, generally accepted legal definition 
of capital controls. While in the broadest sense these are measures meant to affect the 
cross-border movement of capital, in its subsequent publications the IMF sticks not to 
this functional definition, but to a juridical definition brought forward by the OECD in its 
Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (2009). This definition considers capital 
controls to be subject to liberalization obligations only if they discriminate between 
residents and nonresidents.6
5 While the IMF (2011b) finds that the spillover effects of capital flow management measures are 
rather weak, Forbes et al. (2011) argue that the signaling effects of capital controls may deviate 
international capital flows to third countries that do not apply these measures. They label this effect 
“bubble thy neighbour.”
6 An explanation for the highlighting of this jurisdictive criteria is provided by the IMF (2011a: 45): „This 
prioritization of measures takes into account institutional and political economy concerns flowing 
from the general standard of fairness that a member expects that its nationals will enjoy as a result 
of its participation in a multilateral framework.” 
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Based on this definition, Ostry et al. (2011b: 563) seek to establish a clear-cut triple 
hierarchy between instruments to manage capital flows. They argue that macroeconomic 
policies should always be applied first and until exhaustion. They also outline a clear 
hierarchy between prudential regulations of the domestic banking system, which might 
affect cross-border flows that are intermediated by domestic financial institutions, 
and proper capital controls, defined as measures that restrict capital transactions 
between residents and nonresidents, as the latter might, from a welfare perspective, 
have a higher distorting effect than the former. Yet distinguishing between prudential 
regulation and proper capital controls is in many cases all but easy. For example, a 
measure limiting the exposure of domestic banks’ foreign currency lending to unhedged 
domestic borrowers that discriminates on the basis of currency denomination instead 
of residency would count as prudential financial regulation, even though it would in fact 
have an effect on capital inflows and thus emulate a capital control measure. 
This problem is somehow fixed by the introduction of the new term “capital inflow 
management,” used in all subsequent IMF publications, in place of “capital controls.” 
Of special relevance here is a paper endorsed by the IMF board in March 2011 that 
defines a set of guidelines (see IMF 2011a; also Ostry et al. 2011a). It provides two 
explanations for the choice of this new term: first, to avoid the pejorative term “controls,” 
and second, to generate a broader definition that goes beyond the strictly legal 
definition of capital controls. Capital inflow management is thus defined as the sum 
of the measures established to slow exchange rate appreciation and/or divert capital 
flows to other countries. It comprises measures distinguishing between residency 
statuses and between currency denominations, as well as other regulations such as 
minimum holding periods and taxes on specific investments that are typically applied 
in the nonfinancial sector (IMF 2011a: 6, see also p. 40f.). 
Yet even with this broadened definition and a broader view of the concepts of proper 
regulation of the domestic financial sector and of cross-border flows, the IMF (2011a) 
insists in its proposed framework on this hierarchy, where the equal treatment of 
investors independently of their nationality is the highest priority. It also introduces 
a further distinction between measures that are assumed to have the potential 
macroeconomic and multilateral effect of dampening currency appreciation, and other 
measures of a general prudential nature. While the latter may be used permanently, 
the former should be applied only as a second line of defense and only for limited 
periods of time. Thus, while the authors state that this framework should be applied 
in a rather flexible manner to specific countries, at the same time it is intended to be 
relevant for all countries with open or relatively open capital accounts (IMF 2011a: 42). 
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2.3. Capital Management Techniques: Taking into Account Entangled 
 International and Domestic Financial Markets 
In fact, enormous advances have been made by the IMF in its positions on the 
management of capital flows, particularly when we bear in mind that until very recently 
it downplayed the damaging effects of high and volatile capital flows in favor of so-called 
positive collateral effects, especially the disciplinary effect of international investors’ 
decisions on domestic policies. The shift towards recognizing the potential dangers of 
capital inflow surges and the complex consequences in terms of increasing financial 
fragility and the challenges for macroeconomic policies represents an enormous 
advance that should not be understated.
However, by defining capital controls as a means of last and only temporary resort, 
the IMF’s new approach poses serious limits to the policy space emerging economies 
require. Indeed, a number of authors argue strongly in favor of capital controls not 
as a temporary but rather as a permanent part of the policy toolkit. This is because 
most of these emerging economies are still more vulnerable to external trade and 
financial shocks than advanced ones, due to a higher degree of financial fragility and 
a lower level of economic diversification. According to this latter perspective, capital 
controls should be part of an overall package comprising exchange rate flexibility, the 
maintenance of adequate international reserves, sterilization, and the development of 
the financial sector. There is a clear need for the deployment of multiple instruments 
instead of a selective approach (Mohan 2012). Consequently, Gallagher, Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo (2012: 5), prefer to use the term “capital account regulations” to 
underscore the fact these belong to the broader family of financial regulations. These 
regulations should comprise not only inflows but also outflows, may vary between price-
based and quantity-based instruments, and should be complemented by capital flow 
management policies in the “source” countries of capital flows in order to distribute the 
burden of the volatility of global financial flows (Gallagher, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 
2012; Rodrik 2010; Cordero and Montecino 2010; Nogueira 2012; Priewe 2011).
Furthermore, the hierarchy that is still persistent in the new IMF framework is 
inappropriate and confusing, as, in order to prioritize and legitimize specific policies, 
it seeks to draw lines between macroprudential measures, measures to influence 
the exchange rate, and capital controls defined in a jurisdictional manner as being 
discriminatory with respect to the residency of investors. The distinction between 
prudential measures on the one hand, defined as permanent, and temporary capital 
flow management on the other, defined as only temporary, is highly unclear. For 
instance, the framework categorizes capital requirements for foreign exchange loans 
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as a permanent macroprudential measure, while it classifies reserve requirements for 
foreign exchange deposits as part of the toolkit of capital flow management techniques 
for influencing the exchange rate (IMF 2011a: 40f. and 45). 
A deeper look at the experience of Korea and Brazil, however, makes clear that there 
is often a great deal of synergy and overlap between these measures. We can identify 
important feedback loops between capital controls and prudential financial regulation, 
as well as between these measures and macroeconomic policy. For example, some 
prudential financial regulation instruments (such as limits on banks’ operations in 
foreign currency) function in practice as capital controls, while some of these capital 
controls (such as taxation of foreign loans) contribute to reducing systemic financial 
risks (Epstein, Grabel and Jomo 2004). Moreover, prudential regulation and some 
types of capital controls aimed at slowing down credit growth or bursting the asset 
bubble may contribute to inflation control (and thus assist monetary policy) because of 
their impact on aggregate demand (see also Blanchard et al. 2010). 
As these synergy and overlap effects are especially relevant in emerging economies 
with a high degree of financial openness and sophisticated domestic financial markets, 
we approximate the approach of Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2004), who combine the 
set of prudential financial regulations and the traditional menu of capital controls and 
summarize both under the term “capital management techniques” (CMTs) (ibid.: 2). 
By drawing on this concept of capital controls as part of a broader CMT approach, 
we stick to the overall idea that these techniques focus on both (i) limiting financial 
fragility associated with capital reversals and (ii) increasing the policy space available 
to exert control over key macroeconomic prices such as the exchange rate and the 
interest rate, mainly to enable the pursuit of countercyclical policies during booms 
and busts and to open up space for redistributive policies. Here, we also put special 
emphasis on the fact that there are important feedback loops between these two 
goals: currency appreciation stimulates speculative positions, for example, in foreign 
exchange derivatives, threatening financial stability. Therefore, the capacity to maintain 
the exchange rate at a competitive level (second goal) contributes to financial stability 
(first goal). However, while in some contexts both goals are relevant and have a 
countercyclical dimension, in others policy makers may face only the macroeconomic 
policy challenge. For instance, nonresident portfolio investments in domestic currency 
denominated instruments do not result in currency mismatches and financial distress, 
as the exchange rate risk remains with the external investor. Yet, the demand for 
domestic currency creates pressure towards currency appreciation, which threatens a 
country’s export performance and thus its overall macroeconomic stability. 
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In order to analyze the effectiveness of CMTs in the case studies presented in the next 
section, however, we simultaneously seek to identify the particularities of each of these 
measures, clarifying the differences between capital controls and prudential financial 
regulation with respect to their impact on international capital flows. 
We define capital controls as a range of financial regulation tools (based on price or 
quantity, or on residency or currency) that manage those cross-border flows (both 
inflows and outflows) that are not (or are only partially) mediated by the domestic 
banking system and are therefore outside the scope of prudential financial regulation. In 
other words, these controls can influence portfolio decisions regarding the capital flows 
of foreign (nonresident) investors as well as those of resident companies and banks. 
On the other hand, we define prudential financial regulation as regulatory tools that 
consist mainly of capital requirements and which affect the asset and liability positions 
of resident banks. Therefore, this latter type of CMT only affects the portfolio decisions 
of banking institutions, which are subject to the Basel capital requirements (based on 
risk-weighted assets) and other rules established by the domestic regulatory authority 
(in most countries, the central bank). 
Additionally, we demonstrate through our case studies that even this kind of broad 
concept may not include all the regulations necessary to effectively manage foreign 
investors’ portfolio reallocations and their impact. A third type of regulation, to regulate 
foreign exchange (FX) derivatives instruments, may also be required within the 
toolkit of capital management techniques. Such regulations appear to be of special 
relevance in cases characterized by a high degree of financial openness, a high level 
of diversification, and a sophisticated domestic financial market – for instance, the 
countries we analyze in the following section. We label these instruments, the focus of 
which is FX derivatives, “derivatives management techniques” (DMTs). 
3. Case Studies: Brazil and South Korea after the Global Financial 
 Crisis
Despite the recent advances in the literature on capital controls and capital management 
techniques, country experiences before (as many comparative case studies in the 
past have demonstrated; see for instance Ariyoshi et al. 2000; Herr and Priewe 2006; 
Magud et al. 2011) and after the global financial crisis (see, for instance, Klein 2012) 
indicate that designing these techniques is a highly complex process, as it depends 
on a set of macroeconomic, institutional and structural factors, such as the degree of 
financial openness, the composition of capital flows and the features of financial and 
currency markets. 
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In order to better understand these techniques and the rationale behind each kind 
of instrument (capital controls and prudential financial regulation), it is necessary to 
complement the conceptual and analytical analysis presented in the previous section 
with comparative case studies of countries that have faced policy dilemmas and have 
resorted to specific CMTs and DMTs (as defined above) to cope with the boom in 
capital flows to emerging economies that has emerged since the global financial 
crisis, and the different currency speculation strategies, among them derivative carry 
trade operations which profit from the high differential between the domestic and the 
international interest rate. 
Unlike the case in the pre-crisis context, emerging-market countries (even those with 
current account deficits) are now unwilling to adopt a hands-off approach to capital 
inflows. As Rodrik (2006: 12) has pointed out, during the period 2003–2007 these 
countries “over-invested in the costly strategy of reserve accumulation and under-
invested in capital account management policies.” In addition to its fiscal cost, the use 
of this strategy to curb exchange rate appreciation can lead to faster credit growth and 
increases the risk of asset price overshooting, the negative consequences of which 
became evident with the global financial crisis. Such countries have thus learned 
lessons from the crisis, which demonstrated that reserve accumulation could not 
cushion them against the adverse effects of financial globalization or the potentially 
harmful effects of excessive currency appreciation. The experiences of Brazil and the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), the two countries selected for the case studies 
in this paper, exemplify this.
 
The following criteria have guided our selection of case studies. First, the similarities 
between Brazil and Korea’s CMT strategies before the global crisis, which combined 
a high degree of financial openness with an aggressive reserve accumulation policy 
under a macroeconomic regime based on a dirty floating7 and an inflation target policy. 
In both countries domestic currency appreciation was the main mechanism used 
to alleviate inflationary pressures; this ensured the efficiency of the inflation target 
regime. Nevertheless, the cost of this strategy was a drop in export competitiveness 
that led export companies to search for hedges and/or speculative gains in an attempt 
to remedy their situation. 
Second, both countries have well-developed and actively traded equity and public 
bonds markets as well as liquid and deep FX derivatives markets, although each has 
its own specific institutional features. As Mihaljek and Packer (2010: 51) have pointed 
7 A system of floating exchange rates in which the government or the country‘s central bank occasionally 
intervenes in order to reduce the volatility or to change the direction of the value of the country‘s 
currency. 
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out, Brazil and Korea have the largest foreign exchange (FX) derivatives markets 
among emerging economies. The combination of these two factors explains the strong 
contagion effect that the crisis had on the Brazilian and Korean currency and financial 
markets. Both countries were significantly affected by the global financial crisis, in spite 
of their current-account surpluses until 2007 and their huge international reserves.8 
Third, the two countries have experienced a period of significant capital inflows since 
2009 and have been the main destinations for portfolio inflows during the new boom in 
capital flows to EME.9 Fourth, while each country’s degree of financial openness and 
macroeconomic regimes have not fundamentally changed since the global financial 
crisis, policy makers in both Brazil and Korea (and other emerging countries) have 
resorted to CMTs to halt the trend of currency appreciation and/or the building up of 
speculative bubbles in asset prices (while rather restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
have been adopted to slow the economy and contain inflationary pressures).
3.1. Korea
As mentioned above, Korea’s and Brazil’s experiences in managing capital flows 
have been very similar since the financial crisis of the 1990s. After 1997, the Korean 
government decided to increase the country’s financial openness. As Kim and Yang 
(2010) point out, it dismantled most capital flow restrictions and, as was the case in 
Brazil as well, capital inflows and outflows became market-determined.10 During the 
capital flow boom of 2003–2007 Korea adopted the strategy of reserve accumulation 
and accelerated the relaxation of outward investment controls in order to stem 
appreciation pressures; this resulted in the elimination of most of the controls by 2007 
(Baba and Kokenyne 2011).
The resumption of inflows following the global financial crisis was led by portfolio 
flows into debt and equity markets and was driven by both external (the post-crisis 
circumstances) and internal factors (Korea’s quick economic recovery and sound 
macroeconomic situation). Short-term bank debt, however, remained lower than in the 
pre-crisis period. The composition of cross-border flows was a consequence of the 
CMT strategy launched by Korean authorities since November 2009 to deal with the 
new boom in capital flows (see chart 1 and table 1). This strategy, in turn, had been 
shaped by the huge contagion effect that the global financial crisis had in the Korean 
8 See Prates and Cintra (2010).
9 Besides Brazil and Korea, the other countries that have been the main recipients of capital inflows in 
the recent boom are South Africa, Peru, Thailand, Indonesia and Turkey. For more details, see IMF 
(2011a).
10 For details on Korea’s capital account liberalization since the 1980s, see Kim and Yang (2010).
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banking system.11 Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Korea is the only OECD 
member that has adopted CMT after the global financial crisis. Therefore, Korean 
authorities have been able to launch these measures despite the constraints implied 
by this membership. 
Chart	1:	Korea	–	Key	Types	of	Financial	Capital	Inflows	(Billion	USD)
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As in Brazil, the sharp devaluation of the Korean currency (won) was associated with 
companies’ operations with exchange derivatives. The overshooting of the won–USD 
exchange rate (see chart 2) between August 2007 and October 2008 was the result 
of the relationship between FX derivatives operations carried out in the onshore Over 
the Counter (OTC) market and the large short-term debt contracted by the country’s 
banks. This link was related to the institutional framework of Korea’s FX derivatives 
market, wherein gains or losses are liquidated in US dollars (i.e. they are deliverable), 
as is the case in most countries, though not in Brazil. 
Before the crisis, the banks sold so-called “knock-in-knock-out” (KIKO) foreign 
exchange options, an exotic OTC derivative for hedging against the appreciation of 
11 In 2009, the government initiated a US$130-billion rescue plan to stabilize the domestic financial 
market, especially the foreign exchange market, because of the huge foreign currency liabilities of 
its banks. It also adopted other policies intended to alleviate the harmful effects of the crisis on the 
domestic financial system (Prates and Cintra 2010).
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the local currency in relation to the dollar, to exporter companies (mainly shipbuilders). 
As Dodd (2009) explains, this option allowed firms to sell dollars at a fixed won–dollar 
exchange rate (which is the price of US dollars) in the event that the exchange rate 
fluctuated within a range pre-stipulated in the contract, providing a long position in the 
local currency. The potential gains of the companies on the transactions (in case the 
won appreciated as they were long in this currency) were capped or limited while the 
losses (in case the won depreciated) were not limited and indeed were geared so that 
losses would occur at a faster rate (usually twice the rate) for a given change in the 
underlying exchange rate.12
These companies began to hedge their foreign exchange exposure in 2004 and 
increased their hedging ratio in anticipation of continued won appreciation. In addition, 
banks – mainly the local branches of foreign banks, which were subject only to risk 
management standards and not to the liquidity ratios or other direct regulations 
applicable to Korean banks – engaged in interest rate arbitrage operations, borrowing 
dollars on a short-term basis, selling these dollars for won on the spot market, then 
buying certificates of deposit or other domestic bonds and selling the won forward 
for dollars. It was against this backdrop of strong capital inflows that authorities 
progressively liberalized capital outflows (Baba and Kokenyne 2011; IMF 2011a).
Chart	2:	Won–USD	Exchange	Rate
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12  According to Dodd (2009), who provides further details on these derivatives, similar exotic derivatives 
were traded in other emerging economies, such as Mexico, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
China and Brazil. 
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To make operations in the OTC derivatives market possible and profitable, Korean and 
locally based foreign banks borrowed in US dollars to sustain their positions in this 
market. With the outbreak of the crisis and the credit crunch in international financial 
markets, these banks were unable to roll over their maturing short-term external 
liabilities as global banks cut credit lines in order to shore up liquidity. Consequently, 
the former started buying dollars to liquidate their external liabilities, thus exerting 
devaluating pressure on the won. This depreciation led to losses on the part of those 
companies that relied on the currency’s appreciation and forced them to hand over 
the corresponding dollars, some of which had to be obtained on the foreign exchange 
market, to the banks. This put further depreciation pressure on the won. Around 520 
small and medium-sized export companies that had purchased KIKO options lost an 
estimated USD 2 billion, being on the verge of insolvency. Several local Korean banks 
suffered when their customers sued or became bankrupt (IMF 2011a; Kim and Yang 
2010; Dodd 2009).
The contagion effect of the global financial crisis thus illuminated the high vulnerability 
of the Korean banking system to changes in global funding conditions due to its large 
levels of short-term external debt and related FX derivatives operations. The CMTs 
adopted by the Korean government since 2009 have therefore aimed, mainly, to reduce 
this vulnerability on a permanent basis, without attention to prospects of immediate 
inflows per se (table 1). In Korea the FX derivatives operations have had an impact on 
the exchange rate as well as on quantity of foreign currency flows because the Korean 
FX derivatives market is deliverable in US dollars.
As the targets of the CMTs were banks’ spot and forward foreign exchange exposures, 
Korean authorities launched a set of prudential financial regulation measures between 
November 2009 and June 2010 (see table 1) with the goal of strengthening banks’ 
foreign exchange liquidity management and limiting banks’ short-term debt and forward 
contracts to sustainable levels. The measures for reaching these FX forward positions 
(for instance, caps on banks’ FX forward operations relative to their equity capital and 
on forward contracts between banks and exporters relative to their export receipts) 
indirectly aim to reduce external borrowing by the banking sector, inasmuch as before 
the crisis Korean and locally based foreign banks borrowed in US dollars to sustain 
their positions in OTC derivatives market. Therefore, prudential financial regulation 
measures, which only addressed banks’ asset and liability positions in both spot and 
forward markets, helped to prevent the external debt from returning to pre-crisis levels 
(see chart 1) and to limit onshore FX derivatives operations. This is because both 
issues were closely linked with the banks’ portfolio decisions. Hence, it can be said 
that these measures contributed to the protection of the exchange rate from renewed 
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 35, 2013 | 17
appreciation pressures resulting from banks’ short-term external debt. Since the 
adoption of the first prudential financial regulation measure, the won–USD nominal 
exchange rate has been nominally stable (the won has appreciated only 0.9 percent; 
see chart 2).
Table 1: Korea – CMTs After the Global Financial Crisis
Date Type Measure
Nov. 
2009
Prudential financial 
regulation
(i) Higher foreign currency liquidity standards to 
reduce the maturity mismatch of banks’ foreign 
currency assets and liabilities and to improve the 
quality of their liquid assets.
(ii) A 125 percent cap (relative to underlying export 
revenues) on forward foreign exchange contracts 
between banks and exporters.
June 
2010
Prudential financial 
regulation
(i) A ceiling on resident banks’ FX derivatives 
contracts of no more than 50 percent and for 
foreign bank branches of no more than 250 percent 
of their capital in previous month.
(ii) A limit on banks allowing them to provide only 
100 percent of underlying transactions for forward 
contracts with exporters (previously 125 percent).
(iii) A stipulation that resident banks’ FX loans and 
held-to-maturity securities (equal to or more than 
one-year maturity) must be covered by at least 100 
percent of FX borrowing with maturity of more than 
one year.
June 
2010
Capital controls A limitation of foreign currency financing to 
overseas use only, with some exceptions for SME 
manufacturers.
Jan. 
2011
Capital controls Reintroduction of a 14 percent withholding tax on 
nonresidents’ purchases of treasury and monetary 
stabilization bonds, bringing the tax back in line 
with the tax on residents’ bond purchases. Foreign 
corporations and nonresidents are subject to the 
withholding tax, but those based in countries that 
have double taxation treaties with Korea and 
official investors are exempt.
Source: IMF (2011a); Pradhan et al. (2011).
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Yet as Pradhan et al. (2011) have stated, the decline in demand for currency forwards – 
especially from shipbuilders, due to a smaller order book in the post-crisis period – has 
also been a contributing factor to the stability of the won-USD nominal exchange rate. 
Furthermore, the measures to limit forward contracts between banks and exporters 
apply only to onshore entities; this allows these agents to engage in contracts offshore 
using non-deliverable forward contracts (NDFs).13
In addition to these prudential financial regulation measures, Korea has also adopted 
two types of capital controls. The main measure is the withholding tax on foreign 
holdings of government bonds and central bank securities, which brings the tax back 
in line with the tax on residents’ bond purchases. This price-based capital control was 
reimposed in January 2011 due to the strong increase in debt portfolio inflows (see 
chart 3), which reached record levels (IMF 2011a). However, the impact of this measure 
on portfolio inflows is likely to be marginal, for two reasons. Firstly, foreign corporations 
and nonresident investors based in countries that have double taxation treaties with 
Korea are exempt (and Korea has this kind of treaty with more than 70 countries) 
(Pradhan et al. 2011). Secondly, this tax has not encompassed equity portfolio flows, 
which have also increased significantly since 2009. 
 
3.2. Brazil
The Brazilian government responded to the 1999 currency crisis with the adoption of 
a new set of economic policies based on an inflation target system and a dirty floating 
exchange rate. This change in the macroeconomic regime was accompanied by a 
process of financial opening that had begun in 1990 and gained momentum in January 
2000, when Resolution CMN n. 2689 allowed the unrestricted access of nonresident 
(i.e., foreign) investors to all segments of the domestic financial market, including the 
derivatives market.
In this context of high capital mobility, the post-global-crisis scenario combined with 
domestic factors (mainly the resumption of economic growth, the depth and liquidity of 
capital and derivatives markets and very high interest rates by international standards) 
resulted in large capital inflows and strong appreciation pressures between 2009 and 
the third quarter of 2011. Indeed, Brazil became the main destination for capital flows 
in Latin America in this period (see table 2 below).
13  For details on NDF contracts in emerging economies’ currencies, see He and McCauley (2010).
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 35, 2013 | 19
Table 2: Brazil and Korea, Selected Macroeconomic Data
Year Policy rate 
(in percent)
FX reserves
(billion USD)
Inflation
(in percent)
Fiscal result 
(nominal)
(in % of GNP)
Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea
2003 23.55 3.96 48.844 154.509 17.05 3.5 -5.23 0.47
2004 16.38 3.6 52.458 198.175 6.29 3.6 -2.9 2.72
2005 19.14 3.33 53.216 209.968 5.77 2.8 -3,58 3.38
2006 15.32 4.23 85.148 238.388 3.27 2.2 -3.63 3.92
2007 12.05 4,73 179.431 261.771 4.08 2.5 -2.80 4.65
2008 12.44 4.73 192.842 200.479 6.57 4.7 -2.0 2.96
2009 10.16 2.04 231.888 265.202 5.06 2.8 -3.3 -1.14
2010 9.89 2.17 280.570 286.926 5.11 2.9 -2.5 -0.04
2011 11.76 3.1 343.384 298.233 6.6 4.0 n.a. n.a.
Source: Oxford Economics, IFS/IMF, Brazil and Korea Statistics. Authors’ compilation.
Two specific features of the Brazilian economy – related, respectively, to macroeconomic 
and institutional factors – reinforced the economic policy dilemmas faced by monetary 
authorities of emerging economies in terms of macroeconomic management in the 
post-crisis context. 
With regard to the macroeconomic factor (which is not the focus of this paper and is 
therefore not detailed here), it is worth mentioning that the reserve accumulation strategy 
faced two important constraints: a significant amount of public debt concentrated in 
short term maturities and a very large differential between internal and external interest 
rates, which made the cost of sterilization operations excessively high and reduced the 
central bank’s policy space for exchange rate management (Prates, Cunha and Lélis 
2009). 
With respect to the institutional factor, the FX derivatives market has played a central 
role in the trajectory of the Brazilian currency (BRL), both before and after the global 
financial crisis (predominantly an appreciation trend, that is, a drop in the BRL–USD 
exchange rate, which is the price of US dollars). This has undermined both the monetary 
authority’s capacity to influence the determination of the exchange rate (based on 
conventional exchange rate interventions) and the efficacy of CMTs. 
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This central role of the FX derivatives market stems from the much higher liquidity and 
depth of the FX futures market in comparison with the FX spot market. Moreover, the 
predominance of the organized segment in the FX derivatives markets (i.e., futures) 
is a specific feature of Brazil’s currency market. According to Avdjiev et al. (2010), the 
BRL was the second most traded currency worldwide in the organized derivatives 
markets in 2010, while the financial volume of FX derivatives traded in onshore OTC 
markets was low (US$18 billion in April 2010) relative to other emerging markets, such 
as Korea. The special features of the Brazilian FX derivatives market stem from a 
set of regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic factors which have reinforced each 
other since the end of the 1990s. 
First, despite extensive liberalization of international capital inflows and outflows, 
convertibility of the Brazilian currency in general is highly restricted at the level of the 
domestic financial sector. This is a consequence of a specific process of high inflation 
with widespread indexation especially in the financial sector during the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s. Indexation prevented the dollarization of domestic financial 
operations and the disintermediation of the banking process. In this context, the 
financial sector engaged in sophisticated trading operations. Financial sophistication 
was further facilitated by the dominance of large domestic and foreign banks Another 
institutional trait of the Brazilian financial system, also linked with the particular 
nature of the inflationary process in the country, is the existence since the 1980s of a 
developed derivatives exchange (the organized derivatives market, called BM&F in the 
Portuguese acronym14), where FX futures contracts are traded.
Brazilian authorities have been keen in their regulatory efforts to prevent dollarization 
during the last decades. Thus, all transactions have to be settled in the domestic 
currency (the Brazilian real - BRL). Foreign currency bank deposits are prohibited, 
with only a few exceptions.15 Consequently, only dealer banks which have access to 
short term external credit lines in the international interbank market, can hold spot FX 
positions.16 
This is a relevant background for regulatory asymmetry within the Brazilian currency 
market, where the stricter regulation of the FX spot market stands out in comparison 
with the FX futures market. While in the former only a few banks which have been 
14 The BM&F merged with Bovespa, the main Brazilian stock exchange on 25 March 2008.
15 FX bank accounts are allowed only for embassies, multilateral institutions and assurances companies 
that deal with foreign trade. However, their use is very limited (Rossi 2012). 
16 Most of the spot FX transactions are settled by transfers of funds between residents foreign accounts. 
The exception is the purchases and sells of foreign currencies related with international travels. In 
this case, the physical flow is allowed (BCB 2012). 
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accorded “Authorised Dealer” status from the Brazilian Central Bank can hold foreign 
currency positions (in Brazil, positions in USD)17, in the latter any agent can hold 
these positions as long as they fulfill minimum standards required by the Brazilian 
exchange (BM&FBovespa) (Ventura and Garcia 2010; Kaltenbrunner 2010). In the 
case of FX futures contracts, the main agents are resident banks (whether Brazilian- or 
foreign-owned), resident institutional investors, non-financial resident companies and 
non-resident investors (who have unrestricted access to the derivatives market since 
January 2000). The wide range of participants in the FX futures market ensures both a 
greater trade volume and a larger diversity of opinions which underlie the liquidity and 
depth of this market. 
This same intention to prevent dollarization is behind another distinguishing feature of 
the Brazilian FX derivatives (futures and OTC) market: it is non-deliverable, as gains 
or losses in these operations are settled in domestic (BRL) and not in the foreign 
currency (USD), which is normally the case in other countries. Precisely because these 
operations are settled in BRL, there are no limits to non-bank positions in the FX 
futures market. This feature has broad implications. It has contributed to high liquidity 
and, therefore, to the key role of this market in exchange rate formation. 
With respect to institutional factors, some traits of the Brazilian financial system have 
also contributed to the growth of the FX futures market. Here, the entry of foreign 
banks plays a specific role. After a banking crisis in 1995, the government fostered the 
entry of new foreign banks,18 some of which had expertise in derivatives trading.19 
Concerning the macroeconomic factors, two stand out. First, the adoption of a “dirty” 
floating regime in January 1999, which has increased both demand for hedging currency 
risk and for speculating through bets on exchange rate changes. Second, between 
2003 and 2011, Brazil offered one of the highest policy rates and, consequently, one 
of the greatest interest rate differentials in comparison with other emerging economies 
(Prates, Cunha and Lélis 2009).
17 In August 2012, only 14 banks held this status, see: http://bit.ly/XOjlF9.
18 On the entry of foreign banks to the Brazilian bank system, see Paula (2011).
19 According to Farhi (2001), the trade volume in FX future contracts started growing in the aftermath of 
this entry, during the second half of the 1990s. Some Brazilian banks, with less expertise in derivative 
trading, begun to simulate the strategy of their foreign peers. Until the price stabilization introduced 
with the Real Plan in July 1994, the spot gold market (negotiated at BM&F) was an important locus 
of investors’ bets on exchange rate changes inasmuch as this market was linked through arbitrage 
to the FX black market. In this context, the BCB intervened in the spot gold market with the aim of 
influencing the black market exchange rate. 
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During periods of low risk aversion both before (2003 to mid-2008) and after the global 
financial crisis (mainly, from mid-2009 and mid-2011), foreign institutional investors, 
primarily hedge funds, have been the most important investor group in the Brazilian 
FX futures market, fostering a real appreciation trend through derivative carry trade. 
This is a different kind of currency speculation strategy from the canonical carry trade 
through spot market operations – that is, borrowing low-interest-rate currencies and 
lending high-interest-rate currencies (Burnside et al. 2006; Gagnon and Chaboud 
2007, Kaltenbrunner 2010). 
In derivatives markets, the carry trade expresses itself as a bet which results in a short 
position in the funding currency and a long position in the target currency (Gagnon and 
Chaboud 2007). Due to the huge differential between the internal and external interest 
rates in Brazil, foreign investors have made one-way bets on the appreciation of the 
Brazilian currency through short positions in the FX futures market (selling US dollars 
and buying BRL), which has resulted in downward pressure on the USD price and, 
thus, upward pressure on the BRL price (Farhi 2010). 
The derivatives carry trade turns out to be even more attractive in Brazil due to the non-
deliverable characteristic of the FX futures market. Foreign and domestic agents can 
engage in derivatives carry trade without disbursing one US dollar. Until October 2010, 
furthermore, this carry trade strategy could also be executed without the expenditure 
of one single BRL because investors could meet their margin requirements in BRL via 
domestic borrowed securities or guarantees from local banks. Despite the predominance 
of foreign investors in the derivatives carry trade, profit-seeking domestic agents such 
as institutional investors and companies have also engaged in it. Furthermore, the 
February 2006 regulation exempting foreign investors from the income tax on returns 
on government bonds also promoted the derivatives carry trade. 
Consequently, the macroeconomic setting has reinforced the liquidity and depth of the 
Brazilian FX futures market, which reached its peak in terms of contracts negotiated 
in 2005. According to Johnson (2007), in the first quarter of 2007, “BM&Fs U.S. Dollar 
contract led the sector (i.e. the foreign currency sector) for the second year in a row 
with a 51.4% increase to 10.97 million contracts. It was followed by CMEs Euro FX 
contract which rose 22% to 6.73 million contracts”.
Moreover, the outstanding performance of the BRL futures market has contributed to 
the increased trading of the Brazilian currency on offshore OTC markets through Non-
Deliverable Forward (NDF) contracts.20 This is because the existence of a deep futures 
20 On the NDF market of emerging economy currencies, see Ho and McCauley (2010). 
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market has made it possible for foreign banks that have an account with the local 
exchange to sell BRL offshore (meeting the demand of international investors who 
were betting on the BRL appreciation) and simultaneously hedge their BRL exposure 
in the onshore future market (Kaltenbrunner 2010). The growth of the NDF market 
for the Brazilian real, in turn, has enhanced even more the liquidity and depth of the 
Brazilian futures market. In this setting, some international investors began to use the 
BRL futures contracts as a proxy for other emerging currencies´ derivatives which 
have been highly correlated with the Brazilian real (such as the Turkish lira and the 
South-African rand) but do not have deep and liquid derivatives markets, which further 
increased the trading of BRL futures contracts. 
FX futures and spot markets are linked by arbitrage that is carried out primarily by 
banks as the dealers in the FX spot market. These agents enter the opposite position 
of foreign investors in the FX futures market (long position in US dollars and short 
in BRL), buying US dollars in this market and selling them in the spot market. With 
this strategy, banks have earned arbitrage profits and, at the same time, generated 
additional pressure on the USD spot price, which has meant a drop in the BRL–USD 
spot exchange rate and an appreciation of the Brazilian currency. Hence, banks have 
played a central role in conveying appreciation pressure through the carry trade in the 
futures market to the BRL–USD spot exchange rate. 
When it comes to the application of CMTs, the above features of the Brazilian market 
have presented Brazilian policy makers with greater challenges than those faced by 
their counterparts in other countries with similarly large derivative markets. While other 
countries have had to address the low efficacy of capital controls in dealing with FX 
derivatives operations (due to their high degree of leverage (as to be carried out it 
requires only a margin requirement), Brazilian authorities have also had to take into 
account the possibility that these operations could simulate the impact of capital flows 
on the exchange rate without any effective foreign currency flows. CMTs focused 
on international capital flows have thus proven to be ineffective in restraining them; 
prudential financial regulation is also insufficient in this case as it does not reach foreign 
investors and non-bank resident agents. 
The Brazilian regulatory authorities have recognized this constraint. Since October 
2010 they have implemented, along with CMTs, specific measures to reach these 
operations. These measures, which we call “derivatives management techniques” 
(DMTs), apply to the FX derivatives operations of all agents, be they nonresidents 
or residents, financial or nonfinancial actors. This new technique, which is neither 
capital control nor prudential financial regulation, has been key in restraining the BRL 
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appreciation trend and, in turn, mitigating the Brazilian government’s economic policy 
dilemma regarding how to contain the growth rate and inflationary pressures without 
reinforcing exchange rate misalignment (see table 2 above).
In October 2010 the Brazilian government strengthened a price-based capital control 
(a financial tax on inflows called Imposto de Operações Financeiras, IOF), which had 
already been adopted at a low level in 2009, in order to curb the undesirable effects 
of portfolio investment in equity and fixed income – an important type of capital flow 
outside the scope of prudential financial regulation – on financial and macroeconomic 
stability. A few days later the government also closed a loophole that had allowed foreign 
investors to avoid the higher tax on fixed-income investments established previously. 
Moreover, it implemented the first DMT: the financial tax (IOF) on margin requirements 
for FX derivatives transactions was increased from 0.38 percent to 6 percent, and 
some loopholes for IOF on margin requirements were closed (see table 3). 
However, the first rounds of CTMs and DTMs proved to be insufficient: the IOF was 
too low to stem the derivatives carry trade due to the latter’s high degree of leverage, 
and private agents found loopholes to circumvent the regulations (see charts 3 and 
4). One of the main strategies that banks used after October 2010 to circumvent the 
new measures was to increase their short dollar positions in the spot currency market. 
In fact, the IOF on portfolio inflows encouraged the build-up of long real/short dollar 
positions in the onshore derivatives market; that is, it encouraged the derivatives carry 
trade supported by resident banks which assume the contrary position of nonresident 
investors in the derivatives market. 
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Table	 3:	 Brazil	 –	 Capital	 Management	 Techniques	 (CMTs)	 and	 Derivatives	
Management	Techniques	(DMTs)	after	the	Global	Financial	Crisis
Date Type Measure
Oct. 2009 Capital 
controls
Implementation of a 2 percent financial transaction tax (IOF) on 
nonresident equity and fixed-income portfolio inflows by the Ministry 
of Finance. 
Oct. 2010 Capital 
controls
(i) Increase in IOF from 2 to 4 percent for fixed-income portfolio 
investments and equity funds. 
(ii) Increase in IOF to 6 percent for fixed-income investments.
(iii) Introduction of limitations on foreign investors’ ability to shift 
investment from equity to fixed-income investments.
Oct. 2010 Derivatives 
management 
techniques
(i) Increase in IOF on margin requirements for FX derivatives 
transactions from 0.38 percent to 6 percent.
(ii) Closing of loopholes for IOF on margin requirements: foreign 
investors in the futures markets no longer allowed to meet their 
margin requirements via locally borrowed securities or guarantees 
from local banks, which had allowed them to avoid the tax.
Jan. 2011 Prudential 
financial 
regulation
Noninterest reserve requirement equivalent to 60 percent of bank’s 
short dollar positions in the FX spot market that exceed US$3 billion 
or their capital base, whichever is smaller (to be implemented over 
90 days).
Mar. 2011 Capital 
controls
Increase in IOF to 6 percent on new foreign loans (banking loans 
and securities issued abroad) with maturities of up to a year. 
Companies and banks previously only paid a 5.38 percent IOF on 
loans up to 90 days. 
April 2011 Capital 
controls
(i) Extension of 6 percent IOF to the renewal of foreign loans with 
maturities of up to a year. 
(ii) Extension of 6 percent IOF to both new and renewed foreign 
loans with maturities of up to 2 years.
July 2011 Prudential 
financial 
regulation
Mandatory noninterest reserve requirement for amounts over US$1 
billion or their capital base (whichever is smaller).
July 2011 Derivatives 
management 
techniques
(i) Appointment of the Monetary Council of the Brazilian Central 
Bank (CMN) as the agency responsible for regulating the derivatives 
market. 
(ii) Requirement that all FX must be priced according to the same 
method.
(iii) Requirement that all FX derivatives must be registered in 
clearing houses.
(iv) Requirement that FX exposure of all agents must be 
consolidated (liquid position).
(v) Implementation of a 1 percent financial tax on all agents’ 
excessively long positions on BRL. This tax can be increased to 
25 percent. On March 2012 exporters’ hedge operations (up to 1.2 
times the exports of the previous year) were exempted from the IOF.
Dec. 2011 Capital 
controls
Reduction of IOF on equity and fixed-income (linked with 
infrastructure projects) portfolio inflows to 0 percent. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the Brazilian Central Bank and Ministry of Finance websites.
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To close this loophole, the Brazilian Central Bank imposed a noninterest reserve 
requirement, a prudential financial regulation tool, on these positions in January 2010 
(see table 3).21 Nevertheless, by switching to short-term foreign borrowing, banks and 
companies were able to find another channel for regulatory arbitrage. As a regulatory 
response, the government imposed the IOF on short-term foreign borrowing in March 
2011. However, private agents were able to make longer-term loans in the context of 
excess of liquidity and searching for yield in the international financial market. In April 
the government subsequently extended the IOF to these loans. Thus, until the first half 
of 2011, the CMTs mainly impacted the composition of inflows rather than their volume 
(see chart 3). 
Chart	3:	Brazil	–	Capital	Inflows	(Million	USD)
 
  
 
* Mainly, external debt contracted with international banks.
** In the country and in the international market.
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Author’s elaboration.
 
21 It is also important to mention that the centralization of macroprudential and monetary policy 
responsibilities within the same institution (the Brazilian Central Bank) contributes to the coordination 
of these two sets of policy tools, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the economic policy. 
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Chart	4:	Brazil	–	Real	USD	Exchange	Rate	(Nominal)	and	Capital	Management	
Techniques Applied 
 
 
 
Note: PR = Prudential Regulation; CC = Capital Control; DTM = Derivatives Market Regulation. 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Author’s elaboration.
The currency appreciation trend was only curbed after the Brazilian government 
implemented a broader set of DMTs at the end of July 2011. The government imposed 
a financial tax of 1 percent on excessively long positions on BRL in the FX derivatives 
market; at the same time, it adopted new rules to improve the market’s transparency 
(see table 3 and chart 4). These measures have had a longer-lasting effect as they 
address not only the marginal requirements but also the notional value of the carry 
trade operations in the FX derivatives market.22 
22 The empirical literature on the efficacy of capital controls has also flourished in tandem with the 
resumption of CMTs since 2009. Based on an econometric model (a GARCH regression), Baumann 
and Gallagher (2012) have found that the introduction of capital account regulations in Brazil 
between October 2009 and December 2012 was associated with a shift from short-term to longer-
term inflows. They have also found that Brazil’s measures had a lasting impact on the level and 
volatility of the exchange rate and modestly increased Brazilian monetary policy autonomy. By 
contrast, Klein (2012) – based on panel and cross-section estimates of the effects of capital controls 
on GDP growth, volatility, exchange rates, and financial variables across 44 countries over the period 
1995–2010 – has found that episodic capital controls are like gates, which can be effective, while 
long-standing capital controls (such as those of the Chinese) are like walls that protect against the 
vicissitudes of international capital markets. Klein points to the Brazilian IOF as an episodic control on 
capital inflows that did not temper the appreciation of the Brazilian currency. However, this finding is 
probably a result of the period covered (until 2010). As mentioned before, only through the adoption 
of broader DMTs in July 2011 has the BRL appreciation trend been curbed. It is worth mentioning that 
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Finally, it is important to mention that the Brazil has been able to launch broad CMT 
and DMT because since the 1990 the government has been very careful avoiding to 
make any commitments under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) 
and signing any Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or Foreign Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) that can reduce the country’s policy space to implement at any moment these 
regulations (Paula and Prates 2012). 
Although most treaties liberalizing trade in services employ a ‘positive list’ approach 
with respect to trade in financial services, capital controls eventually can be inconsistent 
with obligations if they intervene in cross-border movements of capital related to the 
service that have been made liberalization commitment. The same concern can be 
applied to DMT, as non-residents positions in the FX derivatives market involves safety 
margin and can result in gains that will be converted to USD and then will be transferred 
abroad. 
4. Conclusion: Lessons from the Cases of Brazil and Korea for 
 Capital Management Techniques 
In this paper, we have argued that the advances made by the IMF in its recent capital 
account management framework are significant and should be applauded insofar as 
they address the need to add capital controls to the macroeconomic toolkit. However, 
we have also demonstrated that both a closer look at this framework and an empirical 
analysis of the measures applied in Korea and Brazil in recent times illuminate the 
limits of the IMF approach. 
First and most importantly, the IMF’s efforts to draw a line between permanent 
macroprudential measures for financial stability on the one hand and temporary 
measures to influence the exchange rate on the other are unsustainable. The theoretical 
analysis and the country studies demonstrate that both goals, and their respective 
target instruments, are interdependent. As emerging markets with open financial 
accounts and sophisticated financial markets, Brazil and Korea exemplify the feedback 
loops between capital controls and prudential financial regulation, as well as those 
between these measures and macroeconomic policy. In the case of Korea, prudential 
regulation of the domestic financial sector has had a strong influence on capital inflows 
as banks are the only agents with access to short-term external credit required for the 
provision of over-the-counter foreign exchange contracts, where gains or losses are 
liquidated in US dollars. Thus, prudential financial regulation is the key instrument for 
none of these studies (including the recent IMF papers) considers the regulation of FX derivatives in 
Brazil as another kind of regulation distinct from capital controls and financial prudential regulation 
(or capital account regulations). This distinction is an important specificity of this paper’s approach. 
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tackling the main causes of external vulnerability and currency appreciation. In Brazil 
this regulation encompasses only financial institutions; therefore, a capital control 
measure (taxation of foreign loans) has been necessary to curb firms’ foreign debt and 
thus ensure financial stability. We have thus drawn on the concept brought forward by 
Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2004), who precisely define capital management techniques 
as the sum of capital controls and prudential financial regulation. We have also added 
derivatives management techniques, which have protected Brazil’s exchange rate 
from appreciation pressures, to the toolkit. 
Second, the case studies show that country-specific factors, specifically macroeconomic 
and institutional aspects, have to be taken into account in the designing of tailor-made 
specific measures. The macroeconomic environment has an important influence on the 
effectiveness of capital management techniques. As the Brazilian experience highlights, 
a wider interest rate differential stimulates regulatory arbitrage. In this context, measures 
have to be even more dynamic, flexible and adjustable, involving a steady “fine-tuning” 
to close the loopholes encountered by private agents in spot and foreign exchange 
derivatives transactions. With regard to institutional features, the Brazilian case shows 
the relevance of tailor-made regulation in the context of highly sophisticated financial 
markets. Here, the level and sophistication of foreign exchange derivatives operations 
have necessitated a third type of regulation, which we have labeled derivative market 
techniques. Only when these were added to Brazil’s capital controls and prudential 
financial regulation did the policy effectiveness in terms of protecting the exchange 
rate from downward pressure increase. Additionally, the Brazilian case serves as an 
example that the effect of foreign investors’ portfolio decisions on the exchange rate may 
be delinked from the volume of international capital flows. As derivative operations are 
liquidated in Brazilian currency (nondeliverable), they are likely to impact the exchange 
rate with very low or even without any international capital inflows our outflows taking 
place. Thus, global rules for managing capital controls have to be sufficiently general 
to give the individual countries enough policy space to adjust them to their needs.
Third, we have argued against the qualification of capital controls as only temporary 
and unilateral means in specific circumstances. As global liquidity is provided 
asymmetrically among countries, less developing economies are particularly vulnerable 
to global liquidity shocks given the limited international use of their currencies. Capital 
management techniques should thus form part of emerging economies’ permanent 
toolkit to prevent the risks of sustained external deficits and currency overvaluation 
and to open up domestic policy space for growth-oriented and redistributive policies, 
as Gallagher, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2012) have pointed out. At the same time, 
domestic policies, especially those of bigger, advanced countries have spillover effects 
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on the rest of the world. As liquidity provision may be important for countercyclical 
policies in these cases, a multilateral framework should also embrace policies to 
contain capital outflows from advanced economies.
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